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VERTICALLY IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS
IN THE GASOLINE INDUSTRY
AT COMMON LAW
By MARK Q. CONNELLY*
A. INTRODUCTION
Cases involving exclusive dealing arrangements, known bustomarily as
"solus agreements", tying gasoline service station operators to their suppliers,
most frequently the large, integrated oil companies, have in the past few
years sparked fresh exposition of the ancient common law doctrine of re-
straint of trade1 by courts in the United Kingdom and Australia.2 Recently
the Ontario Court of Appeal has become the first Canadian appellate court
* © Copyright, 1976, Mark Q. Connelly.
Professor Connelly is Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University. The writer gratefully acknowledges the numerous helpful suggestions
of his colleagues, Harry J. Glasbeek and John D. McCamus, and the research
assistance of Richard K. Watson, a recent graduate of the School.
1 Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711), 1 P. Wins. 181 (K.B.) is the earliest leading case,
although much earlier cases are cited in the reference works, for example, J. D. Heydon,
The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (London: Butterworths, 1971) at 2-11; H. Blake, Em-
ployee Agreements Not to Compete (1960), 73 Harv. Law Rev. 625 at 631-32; W. L.
Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies (1954), 21 U. Chi. Law Rev.
355 at 373-75.2 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd., [1968] A.C. 269;
Petrofina (Gt. Britain) Ltd. v. Martin, [1966] Ch. 146 (C.A.); Cleveland Petroleum
Co. Ltd. v. Dartstone Ltd., [1969] 1 All E.R. 201 (C.A.); Texaco Ltd. v. Mulberry
Filling Station Ltd., [1972] 1 All E.R. 513 (Ch. Div.); Amoco Australia Ltd. v. Rocca
Bros. Motor Engineering Co. Ltd. (1973), 1 A.L.R. 385 (High Ct), aff'd [1975] 1 All
E.R. 968 (P.C.). The Esso and Petrofina cases are the subject of a comparative com-
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to consider these arrangements in the gasoline industry from the restraint of
trade perspective; 3 its approach appears to be more conservative, in effect
more pro-oil company, than the approaches of the English and Australian
appellate courts. In Stephens v. Gulf Oil Canada Ltd.,4 the Court of Appeal,
reversing the trial court,5 held that the solus agreement before it, at least in
the peculiar procedural context in which the case arose, was not subject to
the restraint of trade doctrine and that, even if it were so subject, the agree-
ment complied with both branches of the relevant test for the enforceability
of such agreements: reasonableness with respect to the interests of the parties
and with respect to the public interest.0
This paper examines exclusive dealing in the gasoline industry under
a restraint of trade analysis. The Stephens case provides an appropriate
focus for analysis since it is the only Canadian appellate decision on point,
the exclusive dealing arrangement disclosed in it is not untypical, and the
Court of Appeal's opinion presents squarely the questions both of applica-
bility of the doctrine of restraint of trade and of the weight to be given to
the interests of the respective parties and the public interest in determining
enforceability.
The facts in Stephens were somewhat complicated. In 1956, defendant
Palen secured a loan of $43,000 from defendant Gulf in order to build a
service station in the city of Ottawa on property owned by Palen. The loan
agreement, dated November 8, 1956, provided that during its term Palen
would deal continuously and exclusively in Gulf products; that Gulf would
sell such products to Palen on specified terms; that the loan was for a period
of ten years and that it could be paid off early without penalty, except that a
balance of at least $100 must remain outstanding until the end of the term;7
that the covenants were to run with the land; and that Palen would not dis-
3 An exclusive dealing agreement in the gasoline industry was considered, and up-
held, under a restraint of trade analysis in 1956 by the Supreme Court of Newfoundland,
Trial Division, in Great Eastern Oil & Import Co. Ltd. v. Chafe, 4 D.L.R. (2d) 310.
Trial court judgments in two prior Ontario cases on solus agreements in the gasoline
industry do mention restraint of trade briefly: McColl Bros. Ltd. v. Avery (1928), 34
O.W.N. 275; British American Oil Co. Ltd. v. Hey, [1941] O.W.N. 397. Two other such
cases, ignoring restraint of trade completely, were decided solely on the law and equity
of mortgages: Re Clarke and Supertest Petroleum Corp., [1958] O.R. 474; 14 D.L.R.
(2d) 454; Re Moore and Texaco Canada Ltd., [1965] 2 O.R. 253; 50 D.L.R. (2d) 300.
4 Opinion of December 4, 1975, not yet reported; leave to appeal to Supreme Court
of Canada denied, April, 1976.
5 (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 241; 45 D.L.R. (3d) 161.
0This constantly reiterated test was first enunciated by Lord Macnaghten in
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd., [1894] A.C. 535 at 565:
It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction
is reasonable - reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties con-
cerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so
guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is im-
posed, while at the same it is in no way injurious to the public.
Lord Macnaghten appears in turn to have derived this test from Homer v. Graves
(1831), 7 Bing. 735; 131 E.R. 284.
7 The loan and mortgage were renewable for another ten years at the option of the
company in the event that the final or 'balloon' payment should not be forthcoming
from Palen at the end of the first ten years.
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pose of the land and improvements except (1) after giving Gulf a right to
purchase them, at the price offered by a third party, for a period of 30 days
after notice from Palen and (2) subject to all the covenants between Palen
and Gulf, including Gulf's right of first refusal and the exclusive dealing.
A mortgage, also dated November 8, 1956, and irredeemable for ten years,
was given by Palen to Gulf and was duly registered. The mortgage in-
corporated the loan agreement by reference and recited that default under
the agreement should constitute default under the mortgage. The mortgage
instrument drew particular attention to the terms of the agreement relating
to exclusive dealing and to Gulf's right of first refusal.
In 1960, Palen agreed to sell to the plaintiff, Stephens, who had been
operating the repair shop on Palen's premises, that portion of the land and
the building which corresponded to the repair shop. Gulf waived its right
of first refusal over that portion of the land that was to be sold to Stephens,
and the land and improvements were divided into two parts, one of which
was conveyed by Palen to Stephens on November 15, 1960. On that date,
and as part of the sale transaction, Gulf, Palen and Stephens entered into
a tri-partite agreement which provided in clause 12 that if either Palen or
Stephens should wish to sell his portion of the premises, he should first offer
it to the other at a price set in the clause. Clause 3 recited that "the purchaser
[Stephens] covenants and agrees that this agreement is subject to the terms
and conditions of" the 1956 loan agreement between Palen and Gulf and
to the mortgage from Palen to Gulf. Finally, clause 13 of the 1960 agreement
provided, perhaps redundantly in light of clause 3, that
[fIn consideration of the Company waiving its right of first refusal ... the pur-
chaser . . . specifically covenants and agrees with the Company, that the said
purchase shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the [1956] agreement for
loan ... including the right of first refusal therein contained, which shall continue
against the purchaser... and further covenants and agrees with the Company that
no petroleum products except those obtained from the Company will be... sold
or dealt in on or about the purchaser's premises ....
In 1966, Palen, without offering his portion of the land and buildings
to Stephens, sold them to Gulf at a price greatly in excess of the price that
Stephens would have had to pay under clause 12 of the 1960 agreement.8
Eventually, Stephens commenced an action against Palen and Gulf
for specific performance of Stephens' right of first refusal or for damages.
As against Palen, the cause of action was for breach of contract, and as
against Gulf, although the pleadings were apparently no model of clarity on
this point,9 the cause of action may be taken to have been the tort of in-
8 As the Court of Appeal noted, stupra, note 4 at 64-65, Palen and Gulf, by negotiat-
ing directly for the sale to Gulf, did not comply literally with the terms of the 1956
agreement, which merely gave Gulf a right of first refusal to purchase the property at
whatever bona fide price might be offered by a third party. However, Stephens was not
damaged by this technical failure, for the most that he could have demanded was that
the property be offered to him at the price specified in clause 12 of the 1960 agreement.
Palen would then have taken Stephens' offer to Gulf, and the company would certainly
have exercised its pre-emptive right since the price specified in clause 12, the price that
Gulf would have been obligated to meet, was only about one half the price that Gulf
actually paid.
9 See the judgment of the trial court, supra, note 5 at 282-84; 202-04.
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ducing breach of contract. Notwithstanding the language in the 1960 tri-
partite agreement concerning the survival intact of all Gulf's ights under the
1956 agreement, Stephens argued that, as a matter of contract interpretation,
his right of first refusal as against Palen was superior to that of Gulf. Both
courts rejected this claim10 and so had to consider the merits of plaintiff's
second contention: that Gulf's right of first refusal over the purchase of
Palen's land was part of a package of restrictive arrangements in favour of
Gulf - of which the most notable part was the exclusive dealing - which
were in restraint of trade and unenforceable." If Gulf's rights were un-
enforceable, then Palen would be without a defence for failure to observe
that clause in the 1960 agreement establishing rights of first refusal between
himself and Stephens, and Gulf might be liable for the tort of inducing
breach of contract.
The trial court, focussing upon the 1956 agreement, from which Gulf's
rights against Palen arose, held that the agreement was indeed a covenant
in restraint of trade12 and that it was not reasonable as between the parties
because it was both more than adequate to protect Gulf's legitimately pro-
tectable interests and quite onerous in its operation against Palen.'s In ac-
cordance with the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, the trial court also
held the agreement not to be reasonable in the public interest, on the theory
that such exclusive dealing arrangements, which are commonplace in the
gasoline industry, erect barriers to entry into oil refining and related industries
by closing off retail outlets to new producers.' 4 As for remedies, the trial court
found specific performance to be barred by laches, assessed damages against
Palen for breach of contract and found Gulf not liable for inducing breach
of contract.'6
Stephens appealed against Gulf and Palen appealed against Stephens;
the Court of Appeal dismissed Stephens' appeal and allowed Palen's. The
court held that since the plaintiff in the action was Stephens, and since
Palen had not shown any dissatisfaction with the arrangements, the agreement
to be considered for purposes of application of the doctrine of restraint of
trade was that of 1960 and only insofar as it restrained the trade of Stephens.
10 Court of Appeal, supra, note 4 at 12-13; trial court, unreported opinion at 15-39
(the reported version of the trial court judgment omits that portion dealing with contract
interpretation; see 3 O.R. (2d) at 243-44; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 163-64).
" Even if the 'package' of agreements were found to be in restraint of trade and
unenforceable, it is conceivable that the right of first refusal in favour of the company
standing alone would not be infirm and that it would be severable from the rest of the
restrictions. This possibility was not discussed by the trial court, and the Court of Appeal,
because of its disposition of the restraint of trade issue, did not have to deal with it.
In any case, it may be doubted that the various parts of the package of restraints upon
Palen's freedom to trade contained in clause 6 of the 1956 agreement were sufficiently
independent of one another to permit severance. See Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K.B.
571.
1 3 O.R. (2d) at 266; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 186.
13 Id. at 267-70; 187-90.
14 1d. at 279-8 1; 199-201.
Is Id. at 282-90; 202-10.
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Relying on the case of Cleveland Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Dartstone Ltd.16 and
on dicta of certain of the Lords in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's
Garage (Stourport) Ltd.,17 to the effect that a person purchasing land with
notice that his ability to trade on it will be subject to certain restrictions may
not avail himself of the doctrine of restraint of trade to escape those restric-
tions, the court held restraint of trade doctrine not be applicable to the facts
before it."' Even if the restraint of trade doctrine were found to be applicable
to the three party agreement, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that Gulf
had discharged its burden of showing the agreement reasonable as between
itself and Stephes.19 Dealers in the position of Stephens gain certain ad-
vantages from their arrangements with Gulf such as: aid in financing their
stock, use of Gulf credit cards by their customers, and Gulf's assistance in
improving their businesses.20 Gulf, on the other hand, has a protectable
interest in the security of its loan that was used by Palen in constructing the
premises, part of which had been purchased by Stephens.21 As for the public
interest aspect of the Nordenfelt test,z2 the only public interest that the Court
of Appeal was able to identify was "the right of men to trade freely, subject
to reasonable restraints which are in keeping with the contemporary or-
ganization of trade". 23 The court found the agreement in question not to be
inconsistent with the public interest as defined. 24
B. THE SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE
1. Application Generally
In Petrofina (Gt. Britain) Ltd. v. Martin, Diplock, L.. gave the most
widely cited modern definition of the doctrine of restraint of trade: "A
contract in restraint of trade is one in which a party (the covenantor) agrees
with any other party (the covenantee) to restrict his liberty in the future
to carry on trade with other persons not parties to the contract in such
manner as he chooses".25
The doctrine's reach appears to have been extended irrevocably beyond
the three traditional categories: post-employment restrictions, 26 restrictions
16 Supra, note 2.
17 Supra, note 2.
18 Supra, note 4 at 28.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 29-32.
2 2 Supra, note 6.
23 Supra, note 4 at 38.
24 Id.
2 5 Supra note 2 at 180.
26 Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688 (H.L.); Maguire v. Northland
Drug Co., [1935] 3 D.L.R. 521; [1935] S.C.R. 412; American Building Maintenance Co.,
Ltd. v. Shandley (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 525 (B.C. CA.); T.S. Taylor Machinery Co.,
Ltd. v. Biggar (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 281 (Man. C.A.). To come within the doctrine,
the restrictions must operate after the term of employment: Warner Bros. Pictures Inc.
v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209; compare, Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd.,
[1964] 1 Ch. 413 at 429; but see, A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macauley,
[1974] 3 All E.R. 616 (restrictions operated during the term, but characterization of
arrangement as 'employment' doubtful).
1976]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
upon the seller of a business,27 and horizontal agreements among com-
petitors to limit their competition, 28 to various types of exclusive dealing
arrangements between suppliers and their customers and requirements con-
tracts between producers and suppliers of raw materials to those producers.
Even before the recent gasoline cases,29 the doctrine had been found appli-
cable by the English courts in cases, for example, where a restaurant pro-
prietor agreed to take all of his requirements of wine from a certain
producer;8 0 where dairy farmers were obligated to sell their entire out-
put of milk to a co-operative creamery of which they were members;31
where hop growers were obligated to sell their output of hops to a certain
marketing agency; 2 and where an automobile dealer had contracted to
purchase all of his requirements of gasoline from the filling station from
which the dealer had purchased the land to erect the distributorship.88 The
High Court of Australia held the restraint of trade doctrine applicable to an
agreement by a baker to take all of his requirements of flour from a certain
miller, 4 and the House of Lords has held the doctrine applicable to the
rules of a professional society seeking to limit the types of trade in which
its members might engage.8 5 In Petrofina, the Court of Appeal expressly
declined to limit the applicability of the doctrine to situations where the
covenantor is prohibited from trading, as opposed to situations where the
manner of his trade is restricted. 6 In that case, the doctrine was held fully
applicable to restrictions upon the covenantoer's ability to trade on a particular
piece of land, 7 and in the Esso case, restrictions upon trading recited in a
mortgage of land were held not to be immune from the doctrine.8
Although a vast proportion of every-day commercial contracts literally
restrain one or both parties' liberty to trade with third parties, if only because
by satisfying a need with one contract one is not likely to enter into another,
English judges generally have not attempted to define the categories of con-
tract to which the doctrine is and is not applicable. In Pharmaceutical Society
of Great Britain v. Dickson, Lord Hodson said:
The issue which in practice, once restraint is found to exist, is litigated between
27Nordenfelt, supra, note 6.
28 Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Vancouver Breweries Ltd., [1934]
A.C. 181 (P.C.).
2 o Supra, note 2.
30 Servais Bouchard v. Prince's Hall Restaurant Ltd. (1904), 20 T.L.R. 574 (C.A.).
31 McEllistrim v. Ballymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society Ltd.,
[19191 A.C. 548.
82 Englsh Hop Growers Ltd. v. Dering, [1928] 2 K.B. 174 (C.A.).
83 Foley v. Classique Coaches Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 1 (C.A.).
84Queensland Cooperative Milling Association Ltd. v. Pamag Ltd. (1973), 47
A.LJ.R. 342 (High Ct.).
35 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Dickson, [1970] A.C. 403.
80 Supra, note 2.
37 Id.
38 Supra, note 2. There is a paucity of Canadian judicial authority discussing re-
straint of trade outside the post-employment and sale of business situations, although in
General Films Ltd. v. McElroy, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 543, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
applied restraint of trade analysis to an exclusive dealing arrangement between a dis-
tributor and an exhibitor of films. The court upheld the agreement as reasonable.
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the parties is not 'Is this the kind of case to which the doctrine applies?' but 'Is
the restraint reasonable?' I do not find it possible to segregate any particular class
of case so as to exclude it from the ambit of the doctrine although there are of
course many cases where it is futile to raise it.39
And in the Petrofina case Lord Denning stated that:
The categories of restraint of trade are not closed. As methods of trading change,
so do the areas of restraint expand. The law, if it is to fulfill its purpose, must
keep pace with them.40
If courts are unwilling or unable to define the reach of the doctrine a priori,
then at its borders, in those cases where, due to lack of historical precedent
or for other reasons, the appropriateness of applying the restraint of trade
doctrine appears doubtful, courts may be expected to declare the doctrine
applicable and then simply to pass the agreements in question through a
very wide sieve of "reasonableness". 41
In recent cases, there have been at least three definitional attempts, none
very successful in the writer's opinion, to identify certain classes of restrictive
agreements as outside the coverage of the doctrine.
An example of the first attempt is contained in Lord Wilberforce's
opinion in the Esso case, where he said that judges have not required a
justification of reasonableness for such contracts "as, under contemporary
conditions, may be found to have passed into the accepted and normal cur-
rency of commercial or contractual or conveyancing relations".42 Later in
the opinion Lord Wilberforce characterized the solus agreement in the case
as follows:
It is not a mere agreement for exclusive purchase of a commodity, though it
contains this element: if it were nothing more, there would be a strong case for
treating it as a normal commercial agreement of an accepted type.43 (emphasis
added)
That something more in the Esso case was the fixed and lengthy period of
the tie and the restrictions concerning the terms upon which the filling station
might be sold. In Queensland Cooperative Milling Association Ltd. v. Pamag
39 Supra, note 35 at 431.
4o Supra, note 2 at 169. In the Esso case, supra, note 2 at 298-99, Lord Reid said:
I would not attempt to define the dividing line between contracts which are and
contracts which are not in restraint of trade, but in my view this contract must be
held to be in restraint of trade.
Compare Mr. Justice Stewart's famous aphorism on the subject of hard-core pornography
in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964):
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand definition; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it ....
41 Compare the opinion of Lord Morris in the Esso case, supra, note 2 at 306, con-
cerning the coverage of the doctrine:
Nor do I think that any firm inference can be deduced from the circumstances
that in respect of certain groups of cases no one has claimed that the doctrine
applies or has sought to invoke it. That might be for the reason that there are
some situations in which it would not be thought by anyone that the doctrine
could successfully be invoked.
42 Supra, note 2 at 332-33.
43 Id. at 337.
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Ltd., wherein the defendant baker had agreed to purchase from plaintiff
milling company all of his requirements of flour to be used at a certain bakery,
Stephen, J. of the High Court of Australia (speaking only for himself on this
point) stated that the case of "nothing more" than "a mere agreement for
exclusive purchase of a commodity" was presented, and that the doctrine
ought not apply.44 Unlike the situation in the gasoline solus agreements, there
was no restriction upon the types of goods that the baker might sell to its
customers, and, assuming the fungibility of flour, the brand used would be a
matter of complete indifference to the baker's customers.45 The distinction
Stephen, J. attempts to draw between the applicability of the restraint of trade
doctrine to contracts restricting the products that the covenantor may sell
(exclusive dealing contracts) and its non-applicability to contracts restricting
the inputs that he may use in manufacturing what he sells (requirements
contracts) does not seem compelling. For one thing, Diplock, L.J.'s definition
of restraint of trade, focussing on restriction of the covenantor's liberty to
trade with persons not parties to the contract, makes no distinction between
the covenantoer's trade with his customers and with his suppliers. Secondly,
and more importantly, the covenantor may be equally impeded in carrying
on his business as he sees fit and in assuring his competitive welfare whether
he be limited in the products that he may sell or the inputs that he must
purchase.
In Queensland Milling, Stephen, J. raised a second basis for exclusion
of the restraint of trade doctrine, which he repeated in dissent in Amoco
Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Rocca Bros. Motor Engineering Co. Pty. Ltd. Since the
doctrine refers to limitations upon a person's liberty to trade, then, the Justice
states, it ought not apply where the covenantor must accept a restriction in
order to obtain some factor of production necessary to his trade. For example,
in the Queensland Milling case, the baker, in order to open the new bakery,
needed financing on terms more advantageous than could be obtained from
banks.43 The only source of suitable financing was the milling association.47
4 Supra, note 34 at 350-51.
45Id.
40 Id. at 346-47.
47 The United States Supreme Court, in construing s. 1 of the Sherman Act (con-
spiracies in restraint of trade) and s. 3 of the Clayton Act (prohibition against exclusive
dealing in its various forms where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition
or to tend to create a monopoly"), has been particularly hostile to arrangements con-
ditioning the availability of one product, the 'tying product', to the user's consumption
of another, the 'tied product'. In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1969), the Court held, in a 5 to 4 decision, that the steel company's
practice of causing a subsidiary corporation to extend land development loans on favour-
able terms to developers who would erect prefabricated homes manufactured by the
steel company on each of the lots developed violated the Sherman Act. The dissenters
objected that the result of the Court's holding might be anti-competitive, as outlawing
what was in effect a form of price competition in the sale of the homes themselves.
In United Shoe Machinery Co. of Canada v. Brunet, [1909] A.C. 330, the Privy
Council held restraint of trade analysis inapplicable to the company's practice of leasing
its machinery exclusively under a condition that it should not be used in conjunction with
machinery made by any other manufacturers, but the decision was criticized by Lord
Reid in Esso, supra, note 2 at 297, and in light of more modem developments it is of
doubtful validity.
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In Amoco, there were no suppliers of gasoline other than the large oil com-
panies, and apparently all of them insisted upon solus agreements as a con-
dition to supplying their product.48 Therefore, in accepting the restrictions in
question, the baker and the service station operator, respectively, were not limit-
ing any liberty to trade that they otherwise would have enjoyed, since neither
would have been able to engage in his chosen trade at all without entering
into such restrictions. In other words, while prior to entering into the contract
in question each covenantor had a theoretical liberty to trade, neither had a
practical ability to trade, and he only acquired such ability by virtue of the
restrictive agreement. By applying the restraint of trade doctrine in such cases,
so the argument goes, courts might actually impede freedom of trade since,
for example, had the defendant baker not been able to open the new bakery
with financing from the milling association, the milling association probably
would have done so itself, thereby "adding to the already large number of
mill-owned bakeries in the area".49 Stephen, J. continued:
If such ties are to be subject to the doctrine, its effect may then be to encourage
vertical integration in the industry, a strange result of this public policy in favour
of the individual's freedom to trade .... 50
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it assumes its own result.
That is, a particular restrictive agreement in a given industry may not be
challenged as a restraint of trade if the dominant powers in the industry have
been successful, through prior agreements not themselves challenged,8' in
making the restraints general, so that no one can enter the industry without
acceding to them. The reward for universal imposition of a restraint of trade
is immunity from the doctrine.
The third line of reasoning that courts have used as a basis for exclusion
of the doctrine, and the one employed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Stephens, states that since restraint of trade implies a derogation from the
covenantor's prior existing freedom to trade, therefore, where a person pur-
chases or leases land on condition that he accede to a restrictive covenant
relating to trading on the land, the restraint of trade doctrine cannot be
applied to relieve him of the covenant. This ground for exclusion was first
4 8 Supra, note 2 at 415-16.
4 9 Supra, note 34 at 351.
501 d., citing the dissent of Douglas, J. in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 at 315 (1949), the leading American case on the legality of ex-
clusive dealing arrangements in the gasoline industry under s. 3 of the Clayton Act. Mr.
Justice Douglas argued that the effect of outlawing such arrangements would be to
encourage the oil companies to integrate vertically by merger, thus turning erstwhile small
business proprietors into clerks. The strengthening of the anti-merger provision of the
Clayton Act (section 7) by Congress the following year probably effectively drew the
teeth from the Douglas dissent insofar as the United States is concerned.
51 If exclusive dealing arrangements were attacked on restraint of trade grounds
early in the course of their appearance in an industry and were upheld, then their validity
might be stare decisis.
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stated in dicta of various of the Lords in the Esso case,52 and it was applied
by the English Court of Appeal in Cleveland Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Dartstone
Ltd. 5 3 In Stephens, the Ontario Court of Appeal expressly adopted the Esso
dicta and held the restraint of trade doctrine not to be applicable to the three
party agreement since:
Stephens did not have any interest in Palen's property at the time when he entered
into the Three-Party Agreement [and] the restrictions imposed upon him as a
condition of being allowed to purchase part of Palen's property conformed with
the covenants to which Palen's property was already subject ,4
The distinction between a person acceding to restraints upon his freedom
to trade on land he already possesses, on the one hand, and acceding to
restraints as a condition of gaining possession, on the other, is a correct
literal construction of Lord Reid's statement in Esso that "[rlestraint of trade
appears to imply that a man contracts to give up some freedom which other-
wise he would have had".55 Furthermore, this basis for exclusion of the
doctrine is comprehensible in terms of courts' hesitancy to throw into doubt
generally the validity of ordinary negative covenants on the use of land,
bearing in mind, as Diplock, L.J stated in the Petrofina case, that "English
law has ever been tender to interests in land". 56 However, insofar as the
restraint of trade doctrine overall seeks to further a public interest in a com-
petitive economy, the distinction seems less than compelling. 7 And as far as
fairness is concerned, s it is doubtful that it is any more intolerable to allow
a man who has taken land subject to restraints to renege upon his agreement
than to allow a man to renege on an agreement to which he voluntarily sub-
mitted concerning the use of land he already owned.
2. May Stephens Raise Restraint of Trade?
Whether or not one agrees with the distinction as a general matter, how-
ever, it is in reality a red herring in the Stephens case. The application of the
52 Supra, note 2 at 298 (Lord Reid), 309 (Lord Morris), 316-17 (Lord Hodson),
and 325 (Lord Pearce). Lord Hodson said:
Mhe purchaser of land who promises not to deal with the land he buys in a
particular way is not derogating from any right he has, but is acquiring a new
right by virtue of his purchase .... [O]n the other hand, if you subject yourself
to restrictions as to the use to be made of your own land so that you can no longer
do what you were doing before, you are restraining trade and there is no reason
why the doctrine should not apply.
In laying out this basis for non-applicability of the doctrine, Lords Reid and Pearce
appear to have had the limited purpose of rationalizing the consistent refusal of English
courts in the nineteenth century to apply restraint of trade analysis to covenants whereby
public houses were tied to particular brewers.
5 3 Supra, note 2; criticized by Walsh, J. in Amoco, supra, note 2 at 397.
64 Supra, note 4 at 26-27.
55 Supra, note 2 at 298.
GG Supra, note 2 at 187.
5 7 See J. D. Heydon, Recent Developments in Restraint of Trade (1975), 21 McGill
Law J. 325 at 330-31, where the author refers to the Esso dicta as a "questionable
limitation on the doctrine [of restraint of trade]".
58 Lord Pearce in Esso stated that it would be "intolerable" to allow a person who
has taken land subject to a tie to repudiate the tie, supra, note 2 at 325.
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Esso dicta by the Court of Appeal in Stephens appears to have resulted from
syllogistic reasoning in the following form: An agreement in restraint of trade
is unlawful only in the sense that it is unenforceable as between the parties
to it.59 Neither of the parties to the 1956 Agreement for Loan - Palen and
Gulf - is complaining of it."" Therefore, Stephens must be raising restraint
of trade in connection with the agreement to which he is a party, that of
1960.1 In that agreement, Stephens was a purchaser of land on which the
right to trade had already been restrained, and, applying the Esso dicta,
Stephens cannot raise restraint of trade.62
With respect, the Court of Appeal appears to have misapprehended the
theory of the plaintiff's action. The gravamen of the action is not Stephens'
attempt to avoid the restraints upon his own freedom to trade to which he
submitted in 1960. If it were, then the circumstances under which he sub-
mitted to such restraints might be of controlling importance. Rather, Stephens
is suing Palen for breach of a contract by which Palen agreed not to sell his
land without first offering it to Stephens, and he is suing Gulf for tortious
interference with that contract. The alleged primacy of Palen's obligation to
extend to Gulf the first right to purchase the land in question is a matter for
Palen's and Gulf's respective defences, and Palen's obligations to Gulf have
their origin not in the 1960 tri-partite agreement but in the 1956 agreement
for loan. Stephens' claim is precisely the non-enforceability of an agreement
in restraint of trade, but the agreement attacked is the one in 1956, and not
the one in 1960. May Stephens make such a claim? In considering an answer,
it may be helpful to distinguish Stephens' action as between the two defendants.
Insofar as the defendant Palen is concerned, Stephens is really not a
party to the restraints which bound Palen and which Stephens seeks to char-
acterize as in restraint of trade. In the famous case of Mogul Steamship Com-
pany Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.,0 3 it was held that a non-party to an
agreement in restraint of trade who suffers injury to his business as a result
of the operation of the agreement does not have a cause of action for damages
against the covenantors. In Mogul Steamship, the defendant ship owners con-
spired (successfully) to drive plaintiff ship owner out of the China tea trade
by engaging in a concerted campaign of predatory pricing.
To do intentionally that which is calculated in the ordinary course of
events to damage, and which does in fact damage, another in his trade is
an actionable wrong if done without just cause or excuse. In Mogul Steamship,
the Lords found just cause or excuse in the promotion of the defendants' own
business interests. Indeed, a banding together by competitors for the purpose
of driving a mutual competitor out of business, far from being subject to
reproach, was regarded as the very lifeblood of England's greatness as a
59 Supra, note 4 at 22-23.
60 Id. at 26.
61 Id. at 25.
62d. at 26-28.
63 [1892] A.C. 25.
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commercial power.6 4 The plaintiff next asserted that the action was maintain-
able because, even if the object of the conspirators were not unlawful, the
means adopted, an agreement in restraint of trade, was unlawful. But, the
Lords held, "unlawful", in the sense of a conspiracy to achieve a lawful end
by unlawful methods, means "indictable". An agreement in restraint of trade
is not indictable; it is unlawful only in the sense of being unenforceable as
between the parties.
In essence, Mogul Steamship announced not a rule of standing for re-
straint of trade cases but a rule of substantive law: that a conspiracy among
traders to injure a mutual competitor's trade by predatory pricing does not
confer a cause of action in favour of the injured competitor. While on the
one hand it continues to be true that agreements in restraint of trade are not
criminal offences, on the other, to the extent the Mogul Steamship holding
was dependent upon a rapturous assessment of the social utility of concerted
predatory pricing, its continued vitality is open to doubt.
There is no absolute rule that a non-party may not complain of an agree-
ment in restraint of trade. In Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club
Ltd., Wilberforce, I (as he then was) held that a professional football player
could maintain an action for a declaratory judgement that the reserve rules of
the league and of the football association were in restraint of trade, notwith-
standing that the player's only contractual relationship was with his team and
not with the league or the association.65 Of course, the rules in Eastham were
aimed to have their principal - and quite harsh - effect specifically upon
persons in the position of the plaintiff, and there is perhaps no such precision
of aim against Stephens in the agreement between Palen and Gulf.
Even if, however, Mogul Steamship were construed as a standing case,
Stephens may be in a stronger position to complain of the restriction between
Palen and Gulf than was the plaintiff in Mogul Steamship to complain of
the agreement there, for Stephens has a contract with Palen, the enforceability
of which rises or falls inversely as the enforceabality of the contract allegedly
in restraint of trade, 66 whereas in Mogul Steamship, the only nexus be-
tween the parties was the plaintiff's alleged injury. There may be some basis
for a distinction between allowing a plaintiff to use a rule of law to create an
action for himself and allowing him to use the rule to defeat a defence to his
otherwise valid action.
04 Id. at 50 (per Lord Morris). See also, Bowen, LJ. in the Court of Appeal, [1889]
23 Q.B.D. 598 at 615-18.
06 Supra, note 26. See also Nagle v. Feilden, [1966] 2 Q.B. 633; Buckley v. Tutty
(1971), 125 C.L.R. 353. In Northern Messenger (Calgary) Ltd. v. Frost (1966), 57
D.L.R. (2d) 456 at 463 (S.C. Alta.), defendant in an action for inducing breach of con-
tract succeeded on a claim that certain of the clauses of the contract breach of which
he induced were void as unreasonable under the doctrine of restraint of trade.
60 This assumes, of course, that the mutual rights of first refusal as between Palen
and Stephens do not themselves contain some independent infirmity. The Court of Appeal
was of the view, supra, note 4 at 48-61, that Palen's right under clause 12 of the 1960
agreement to purchase Stephens' land at a fixed price was void as a "restraint on aliena-
tion" and that Stephens' corresponding right over Palen's land therefore could not stand.
The court's theories on the law of real property are beyond the scope of this paper.
[VOL. 14, NO. I
Solus Agreements at Common Law
Stephens' standing to raise the restraint of trade issue against Gulf, in
order to attempt to defeat the company's defence of justification for inducing
breach of the contract between Palen and Stephens,67 is more straightforward.
The agreement for loan of 1956 provided that it was to enure to the benefit
of, and be binding upon, all purchasers and grantees of Palen's lands and all
persons claiming any interest therein through Palen.68 Stephens is .such a
person. Furthermore, by their terms, clauses 3 and 13 of the 1960 tri-partite
agreement made Stephens a party to the 1956 agreement for loan, to the
terms and conditions of which Stephens expressly agreed to subject himself.
As against Gulf, therefore, Stephens stands in the shoes of Palen under the
1956 agreement, and he should have all the rights and obligations of Palen,
including the right to claim that the agreement was unenforceable, whether
or not Palen himself chooses to make such a claim.
In summary, and without putting too fine a point on the various factors
that would lead to a conclusion that Stephens has locus standi, this writer
would agree with the trial judge that Stephens "has a sufficient interest in the
subject matter of the agreement of 1956 ...that he may properly raise its
validity as an issue in these proceedings". 69
Having decided, however, that Stephens could not raise the doctrine of
restraint of trade in respect of Palen's obligation to give Gulf a right of first
refusal, the proper course for the Court of Appeal would have been to dismiss
Stephens' action for that reason, rather than to misconstrue the theory of the
litigation and to proceed as if Stephens were complaining of a restraint upon
his own freedom to trade. What Stephens wanted was the land that Palen sold
to Gulf - not a declaration that Stephens was free to trade in the goods of a
producer other than Gulf.
C. APPLICATION OF THE NORDENFELT TEST
The Court of Appeal in Stephens was satisfied that even if the arrange-
ments before it were susceptible to restraint of trade analysis, they were valid
under Lord Macnaghten's test in Nordenfelt: "reasonable" with respect to
both the private interests of the parties and the public interest.70
Of course, the two aspects of the Nordenfelt analysis do not fit into
mutually exclusive, water-tight compartments because, as the Court of Appeal
noted in Stephens, the entire "doctrine of restraint of trade is founded upon
67 Of course, the fact that Stephens could raise the restraint of trade issue does not
necessarily mean that he would succeed as against Gulf. The trial court held that, not-
withstanding that the 1956 agreement for loan was in restraint of trade and unenforce-
able, Gulf's bona fide, although mistaken, belief in the enforceability of its contract was
a defence to the tort of inducing breach of the later contract, 3 O.R. (2d) at 289; 45
D.L.R. (3d) at 209. See generally, J. D. Heydon, The Defense of Justification in Cases
of Intentionally Caused Economic Loss (1970), 20 U. of T. LJ. 139 at 161-71.
68 Supra, note 4 at 25.
0 Trial court, unreported opinion, at 41.
7o Supra, note 6.
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public policy".71 And not only is the doctrine generally an expression of public
'policy' (as indeed may be said of any common law doctrine) but, in applying
it, the public and private 'interests' tend to run together. This is so for at least
three reasons. First, it is in the interests both of the public and of the party
restrained "that a man should be free to exercise his skill and experience to
the best advantage for the benefit of himself and of all those who desire to
employ him".72 That is, there is both a public and a private interest not only
that a man be kept off the welfare rolls but that he make the maximum
productive contribution to society of which he is capable. Secondly, there is
both a private and a public interest that parties be compelled to abide by
contracts freely made. 3 Thirdly, when weighing the private interests of the
covenantee, it has been established, at least since the case of Herbert Morris
Ltd. v. Saxelby,74 that the court will make its own examination of what are
those rights for which he may legitimately seek protection. It is consideration
of the public interest that determines what is an interest of the covenantee
which he has a right to have protected.7 5
1. Interests of the Parties
As for the interests of the covenantee Gulf Oil Company that would
justify the restraint of trade in Stephens, the Court of Appeal looked solely
to the mortgage loan for $43,000 made by Gulf to Palen in 1956 and to Gulf's
interest in the security of that loan. The loan was for a period of ten years
and therefore the court was satisfied that a tie for an equal period was no
more than reasonable to protect Gulf's interest in repayment. 70 As for the
fact that Gulf had required a provision whereby the mortgage could not
be paid off in full before the expiry of the ten year term, the court said
that "[t]he mere postponement of the right to redeem a mortgage is not in
itself unreasonable".77 That is a fair enough statement of the law of mort-
gages, but the Court of Appeal appears to have missed the evidentiary
significance of the non-redeemability of the mortgage. One would not
expect a lender whose chief concern was the security of his loan to prohibit
repayment in full before the expiry of the term. The non-redeemable mort-
gage is simply an insufficient base upon which to erect Gulf's right to the
71 Supra, note 4 at 13. See also the opinions of Lord Parker in A.G. Australia v.
Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., [1913] A.C. 781 at 797 and Lord Wilberforce in Esso v.
Harper's Garage, supra, note 2 at 340.
72 Per Lord Atkinson in Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, note 26 at 699; but
see Lord Parker at 707-08 in the same case insisting on the complete separateness of the
two aspects of the Nordenfelt test.
73 English Hop Growers Ltd. v. Dering, supra, note 32 at 181. Taken by itself, in
the restraint of trade context this principle would usually point to a result opposite from
that indicated by the freedom-to-trade principle. Depending on the result one wishes to
reach, one will put more or less weight on the word "freely" in the formulation. See
discussion of equality of bargaining power, infra, text accompanying footnotes 152-54.
74 Supra, note 26.
75 Per Diplock, L.J. in Petrofina (Gt. Britain) Ltd. v. Martin, supra, note 2 at 182;
see also, Amoco v. Rocca Bros., supra, note 2 at 400.
70 Supra, note 4 at 30-32.
77 Id. at 31.
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restraint of trade in question. To paraphrase the Privy Council in another
restraint of trade case: it is a case not of a restrictive covenant in aid of a
mortgage, but of a mortgage in aid of a restrictive covenant.78
If the Court of Appeal's analysis of Gulf's interest in the mortgage was
insufficient to sustain the court's favourable view of the arrangements, then
there must be considered what other interests exist for which Gulf might legiti-
mately seek protection in this type of contract.79 Gulf is in the business of
selling gasoline and other automotive products, and, in general, it is in the
company's interest to sell as much of these products as possible at the best
price it can obtain. Is that interest one which the company may seek to further
by long term contracts tying its retail distributors to itself as sole supplier?
This question has yet to be faced squarely by any court in a gasoline solus
agreement case.
It has been held in many cases that one interest a covenantee may not
seek to further by means of a contract in restraint of trade is protection
against competition per se.80 Where an oil company (or the producer of
any product) seeks to ensure itself of a high sales volume by entering into
long term exclusive dealing contracts with otherwise independent retailers,
it would appear reasonable to construe the arrangement as an effort by the
oil company to protect itself against competition per se. That is so because
if the producing company were unable to tie retailers to it, then in order to
sell gasoline it would have to engage in constant battle against other producers
to convince retailers of the superior merits of its product, its better price, or
its better terms of delivery or payment as compared with other possible sources
of supply. The fact that the competitive pressure to find outlets is lightened
by the practice of tying up retailers under long term contracts of course does
not mean that competition among producers is eliminated. For even long term
contracts do expire, and each producer must keep its product,81 prices and
terms sufficiently attractive to sign up renewals and new retailers entering
the business for the first time. Furthermore, no matter how many retailers
(short of all or virtually all of them in a given geographic market) a particular
oil company has tied to itself, the company won't sell much gasoline unless it
remains competitive with the other oil companies in the important particulars.
That is, if Company X, for example, charged its retailers a great deal more
78 Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Vancouver Breweries Ltd., supra,
note 28 at 188.
79 Of course, the burden would not be on a court to ferret out such interests, but
on Gulf to show them, since the party asserting validity of a contract in restraint of
trade has the burden of proving its reasonableness in respect of the parties' interests,
Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, note 26. The reported opinions in Stephens, at
trial and appellate levels, do not reveal that Gulf argued any interest other than the
security of its loan for which it required protection.
80 For example, American Building Maintenance Co., supra, note 26; Attwood v.
Lamont, supra, note 11; Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, note 26; Maguire v.
Northland Drug Co., supra, note 26; Regent Oil Co. Ltd. v. J.T. Leavesley (Lichfield)
Ltd., [1966] 2 All E.R. 454 (Ch. Div.); Vancouver Malt, supra, note 28; McEllistrim's
case, supra, note 31.81 We are speaking in general terms, ignoring the high degree of fungibility in the
gasoline produced by the various oil companies.
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for its gasoline than Companies Y and Z charged for theirs, it would not be
long before X's retailers would lose their customers to the retailers of Y and
Z,82 and, despite the existence of a binding contract, X's retailers would be
forced to stop doing business with X. Nonetheless, it is asserted, exclusive
dealing contracts lighten the competitive pressures for any particular cove-
nantee-oil company, and, therefore, it is correct to characterize them as a
means of protection againse competition per se.
An examination of the cases, however, would indicate that the bald
statement that "a covenantee in a contract in restraint of trade is not entitled
to protection against competition per se" is not really a settled proposition.
Many of the cases wherein such a statement has been made have involved post-
employment restraints, which courts are particularly chary of enforcing.83 In
the sale of business cases, on the other hand, it is obvious that the covenantee-
purchaser may well be entitled to protection from the competition of the
seller.8 4 For it is precisely that covenant by the seller not to compete - at least
under his own name - that is the economic substance of a sale of "good-
will", s5 And in cases of the type represented by Vancouver Malt,8 6 to say that
the covenantee is not entitled to protection against competition per se is merely
another way of stating that the court will not enforce naked, non-ancillary
agreements not to compete made between erstwhile or potential competitors.87
When exclusive dealing cases are examined, the record is seen to be exceed-
ingly mixed.
82This assumes that the ultimate consumers, car owners, have a choice among
outlets supplied by a number of companies and, as would usually be the case where the
first supposition holds, that those retailers who have a cheaper source of supply will
find it advantageous in order to expand their share of the business to pass at least some
of their relative cost savings on to consumers - in other words, that the market for the
ultimate consumer be 'workably competitive'.
8 3 Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, note 26; Maguire v. Northland Drug Co.,
supra, note 26; American Building Maintenance Co. v. Shandley, supra, note 26;
Attwood v. Lamont, supra, note 11.
8 4 The distinction on this ground between covenants given in the employment con-
text and those entered into in the sale of a business is discussed by Lord Atkinson in
Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, note 26 at 701.
85 Even in the sale of business cases, however, the parties are not completely free
to sterilize effectively the capacity of the seller to engage in any trade at all, and, there-
fore, it is necessary in each case to determine the exact scope of the business with respect
to which goodwill has been sold.
s8 Supra, note 28.
87 "Ancillary" and "non-ancillary" are labels deriving from the famous opinion of
Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft, discussing common law antecedents to the Sherman
Antitrust Act, in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). "Ancillary" covenants in restraint of trade were those made
in furtherance of some other lawful contract, such as a contract for employment or sale
of a business; "non-ancillary" covenants (Judge Taft did not actually use that term)
would be those made not to facilitate some other lawful commercial agreement but
rather to restrain competition standing alone. Although the Vancouver Malt case would
suggest that "non-ancillary" agreements in restraint of trade were unenforceable at
common law in England, such a generalization is not warranted by an examination of
the cases. Rather, the enforceability of such agreements seems to have varied along a
particularly erratic course. See Heydon, supra, note 1 at 240-57.
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In McEllistrim's case,88 where a dairy farmer was obligated to sell his
entire output of milk to a certain co-operative dairy society, Lord Birkenhead
first stated that the society was not entitled to be protected against mere com-
petition but then conceded that it might well have had a protectable interest
in a stable milk supply, an interest which, however, it could have secured by
a contract less onerous in its operation on the farmer. 89 Similarly, in Regent
Oil Co. Ltd. v. J. T. Leavesley (Lichfield) Ltd.,90 a gasoline solus agreement
case, the court stated that the oil company was not entitled to protection
against competition per se but that its interest in selling as large a quantity of
its goods as possible could be protected by an otherwise "reasonable" exclusive
dealing arrangement. 91 For reasons discussed above, 92 the writer believes the
respective statements in each of these cases to be internally inconsistent. In
the Queensland Milling case,93 Stephen, J. stated (for himself alone on this
point) that the doctrine that the covenantee is not entitled to protection against
competition per se does not apply where the parties to the agreement do not
compete between themselves, that is, in the typical exclusive dealing case.94
In Esso, Lord Reid did not find the oft-quoted statement that "a person is
not entitled to be protected against mere competition... very helpful in a case
like the present", 95 and all of the Lords appeared to concede that Esso had a
protectable interest in maintaining what Lord Reid termed "a stable system
of distribution". 96 Lords Reid, Morris and Pearce accepted Esso's argument
that the solus system facilitated certain economies in distribution not other-
wise realizable,97 a point on which no evidence was offered by Gulf in the
Stephens litigation.
Perhaps the most interesting observation on the matter of protection
against competition per se in an exclusive dealing arrangement is that of Lord
Denning in Petrofina. His Lordship was of the view that if solus agreements
had been challenged when they were first introduced into England, they might
well have been held unreasonable for the reason that the company that intro-
duced them was seeking simple protection against the competition of its rivals.
Since, however, they were not attacked then, and since they had come to
dominate the industry, "a comparatively small company like Petrofina [if] it
88 Supra, note 31.
89 Id. at 563-65.
9o Supra, note 80.
91 Id. at 456.
9 2 Supra, text accompanying notes 80-82.
93 Supra, note 34.
94 1d. at 348. It would be possible, however, for the parties to exclusive dealing
arrangements to be in direct competition with each other, as where, a vertically inte-
grated oil company owns its own retail outlets as well as supplies service station owners
under solus agreements. In this situation, which is common in the gasoline industry in
Canada, it might be relevant to determine whether the purpose or effect of the solus
agreement is to put service station owner-operators at a competitive disadvantage in
relation to company-owned outlets.
9 5 Supra, note 2 at 301.
96Id. at 302.
97 Id. at 302, 312, 322-23.
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is to obtain an entry into the trade" has to accept solus agreements as the
modus operandi "lest it be swallowed up by its giant rivals".98 That Gulf's
position in the gasoline industry in Canada in the mid 1950's was analogous
to Lord Denning's characterization of Petrofina's position in England in the
early 1960's is by no means apparent. 9
In the trial court judgement in Stephens, Mr. Justice Henry did not discuss
the question whether Gulf had a protectable interest in a "stable system of
distribution" such as to warrant a solus agreement,100 but it is reasonably clear
that his answer would have been in the negative since, in his view, the sole
desideratum was to avoid any impairment of "the competitive market func-
tion,,.-01
In summary, restraint of trade decisions to date do not establish a clear
rule that a covenantee may not through an exclusive dealing contract seek to
protect itself against the competition of its rivals. Rather, the rule of no-
protection-against-competition-per se would appear to be limited to post-
employment contracts, bare covenants among competitors not to compete,
and, perhaps, certain other contracts where the covenantee's desire to protect
itself against competition per se is demonstrably at the pecuniary expense of a
covenantor who is in a position of grossly unequal bargaining power with the
covenantee. For example, in McEllistrim's case, where the society had bound
its members perpetually to sell milk exclusively to it, it was established that
other creameries were willing to pay the farmers a better price for the milk.102
The extension of the rule more generally would depend upon whether courts
felt that an important aspect of the public policy behind the restraint of trade
doctrine was the fostering of a competitive economy.
Turning to reasonableness from the perspective of the interests of the
covenantor, it was stated by Lord Parker in Herbert Morris that courts will
not "weigh the advantages accruing to the covenantor under the contract
against the disadvantages imposed upon him by the restraint", 0 3 and, at least
in the context of non-employment cases, a number of courts have said that
the parties will be presumed to be the best judges of what is reasonable in
their own interests.' 0 4 What modem courts do in reality, however, in determin-
08 Supra, note 2 at 173-74. See also the similar analysis by Diplock, LJ. in the same
case at 188.
09 Furthermore, the logical result of Lord Denning's reasoning on this point may be
criticized for a reason similar to that advanced in connection with Stephen, J.'s views
as to applicability of the restraint of trade doctrine in the Queensland Milling case (text
accompanying notes 46-51, supra): universality of an anti-competitive practice produces
immunity from attack.
100 Like the Court of Appeal, the trial court analyzed Gulf's interests solely in
terms of protection for its loan: 3 O.R. (2d) at 268-69, 45 D.L.1L (3d) at 188-89.
101 3 O.R. (2d) at 280; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 200.
102 Supra, note 31.
103 Supra, note 26 at 707.
104 Northwestern Salt Co. Ltd. v. Electrolytic Alkilai Co. Ltd., [1914] A.C. 461, 471
(H.L.); English Hop Growers Ltd. v. Dering, supra, note 32 at 187; Texaco Ltd. v.
Mulberry Filling Station Ltd., supra, note 2 at 525; Great Eastern Oil & Import Co.
v. Chafe, supra, note 3 at 318.
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ing consistency of the agreement with the interests of the parties - as is well
illustrated by the Esso, Petrofina and Amoco cases - is to weigh what the
covenantor has given (his freedom in the future to trade as he sees fit) as
against what he has received (financing, rebates or other benefits).1°5 What
the covenantee-oil company gets is, in a sense, the mirror image of what the
covenantor-service station proprietor gives, and where the court determines
that the covenantor has given too much it will find the agreement not reason-
able.
Thus, for example, in both Petrofina0 6 and Amoco, 07 where the agree-
ments were struck down, the service station operators were obligated for many
years (12 and 15 years, respectively) to purchase a very large minimum gallon-
age of gasoline, totally without regard to whether or not they could sell such
gasoline. While there does not appear to have been a mandatory minimum
purchase requirement in Esso, the Lords there held invalid a solus agreement
for 21 years, "far beyond any period for which developments are reasonably
foreseeable",108 but sustained the enforceability of a shorter agreement, for
a period of four and a half years.
In Stephens, the Court of Appeal held the agreement to be not unreason-
able in the covenantor's interests. In return for promising to deal exclusively
in Gulf products and to carry on the business continuously, efficiently and in
a proper manner,109 the proprietor received the following benefits: ° the
mortgage loan, the assistance of Gulf in financing the dealer's stock and im-
proving his buildings, and the use of Gulf credit cards."' The only one of
these benefits that Gulf was obligated to supply under the terms of the con-
tract, however, was the mortgage loan, and it would appear that in construing
the reasonableness of the contract, the court should have judged it by the
105 The historical evolution of courts' willingness to consider the interests of the
covenantor, and not just the need of the covenantee for protection, under the private
interests branch of the test is discussed in the context of post-employment restraints in
Blake, supra, note 1 at 686-87. An emphasis upon the right of the covenantee to be pro-
tected is seen in the Nordenfelt formulation itself, supra, note 6 at 565, where after
declaring the test of validity to be "reasonable in reference to the interests of the parties
concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public", Lord Macnaghten
adds a clause of explication: "so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protec-
tion to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way
injurious to the public".
'o Supra, note 2.
107 Supra, note 2.
108 Supra, note 2 at 303.
1o9 Supra, note 4 at 3 and trial court judgment, 3 O.R. (2d) at 265; 45 D.L.R. (3d)
at 185. The obligation to carry on the business continuously could be quite burdensome
if, for example, the proprietor was not doing well and wished to engage in another
business but could not find an acceptable purchaser for the service station business.
11 The proprietor in relation to whom the Court of Appeal construed the agree-
ment was Stephens - not Palen. See text accompanying notes 59-69, supra, and 114.
infra.
111 Supra, note 4 at 28.
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obligations contained therein, and not by the additional, but un-bargained
for, benefits that the oil company from time to time chose to confer.11 Nor
does there appear to have been any evidence that the mortgage was at a par-
ticularly favourable rate.113
In sum, the covenantor in Stephens appears to have received an average
mortgage loan in return for submitting himself to a ten-year restraint upon
his freedom to choose suppliers for his business as he saw fit." 4 It was not
enough for the oil company that he should repay their investment. It is respect-
fully submitted that the Court of Appeal was too quick to find in favour of
Gulf on the reasonableness-in-the-interests-of-the-parties point. Gulf had the
burden of proof,"5 and the company appears to have adduced little, if any-
thing, in the way of evidence. In essence, Gulf appears to have bought itself
a cheap ten years' worth of freedom from the competition of its rivals for the
business of a certain outlet. While we would not expect, or perhaps even
desire, a court to make forays into disputed points of economics, we would
expect at this late date in the history of competition policy that if an appellate
court were to show any predisposition on a case of the present type, it would
be toward having huge oil companies compete for customers on the basis of
price rather than long term exclusive dealing contracts.
2. The Public Interest
The second branch of the Nordenfelt test, the reasonableness of the
arrangement in light of the public interest, has in practice been, if not forgot-
ten, at least ignored. In 1913, Lord Parker stated that he was "not aware of
any case in which a restraint though reasonable in the interests of the parties
has been held unenforceable because it involved some injury to the public",1 6
and a half century later Diplock, L.J. was able to make virtually the same
112 Amoco v. Rocca Bros., supra, note 2 at 396-97. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether this additional assistance was in fact rendered to Palen/Stephens or whether
Gulf simply had a general policy of aiding its dealers. See, Court of Appeal opinion,
supra, note 4 at 28, and trial judgment, 3 O.R. (2d) at 266-67; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at
186-87.
113 Indeed, there was some evidence to the contrary: see trial judgment, 3 O.R. (2d)
at 268; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 188.
114 Since the Court of Appeal construed the agreement only in its effect upon
Stephens, it construed the term as being only six years because Stephens became a party
four years after the original agreement, supra, note 4 at 29. Agreements for durations
of approximately five years had been declared valid in Esso, supra, note 2 and in Great
Eastern Oil & Import Co. Ltd. v. Chafe, supra, note 3. If, however, the agreement had
been construed in its operation on Palen, as has been suggested would have been the
proper course (text accompanying notes 59-69, supra), then its duration was ten years.
15 Supra, note 79.
110 A.G. Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., supra, note 71 at 795. Heydon,
supra, note 1 at 29-30, catalogues the reasons why he believes that public interest
analysis was effectively shunted aside by the English courts in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
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statement." 7 The situation has not changed as of this writing, with the excep-
tion of the trial court judgement in the instant case."l8
Not content to rest his finding of the invalidity of the solus agreement on
the interests of the parties, Mr. Justice Henry found that it also conflicted with
the public interest, which he found not to be restricted merely to the preven-
tion of "pernicious monopoly", 119 but to embrace "preservation of the com-
petitive market system"i ' 20 Mr. Justice Henry's conclusions as to the incom-
patibility of the solus agreement with the public interest were in accord with
the views of plaintiff's expert economic witness who testified as to his own
opinions and as to the conclusions of a certain report of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission. 12' The trial judge found that solus agreements of the
type of the 1956 agreement for loan limited consumers' choice among various
automotive products; encouraged wasteful, non-price competition among sup-
plying companies; created various inefficiencies in the distribution of auto-
motive products; and, by tying up sales outlets, erected barriers to entry by
new producers and new products into the market.' 2 As the trial judge pointed
"17 Petrofina (Gt. Britain) Ltd. v. Martin, supra, note 2 at 181.
118 The decision in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Dickson, supra, note
35, invalidating the Society's rule restricting the types of products that member-pharma-
cists could deal in, rested at least partly on public interest grounds, but a finding of
inconsistency with the public interest followed automatically from the finding that the
rule was beyond the statutory powers of the Society. In Esso, Lord Hodson explicitly
rested his decision on the public interest, supra, note 2 at 321. It is interesting to specu-
late what others of the Lords would have found as to the public interest had the service
station proprietor in Esso not explicitly disclaimed reliance on the public interest aspect
of the test, supra, note 2 at 340. In that case, Lords Hodson (at 319) and Reid (at 300)
stated that the decision in the case of Kores v. Kolok, [1959] Ch. 108, wherein two em-
ployers mutually agreed not to hire each other's former employees, should have been
rested on public interest grounds. There is one Canadian trial court judgement holding
a post-employment restraint among medical doctors invalid as contrary to the public
interest in patients' freedom to consult the doctor of their choice: Sherk v. Horowitz,
[1972] 2 O.R. 451; (1971) 25 D.L.R. (3d) 675; aff'd on other grounds, [1973] 1 O.R.
360; (1972) 31 D.L.R. (3d) 152.
119 Prevention of "pernicious monopoly" was the public interest identified by Lord
Parker in the Adelaide Steamship case, supra, note 71 at 796.
120 3 O.R. (2d) at 274; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 194.
121 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report on an Inquiry Into the Distribu-
tion and Sale of Automotive Oils, Greases, Anti-Freeze, Additives, Tires, Batteries,
Accessories and Related Products (Ottawa, 1962). To the extent that he relied on con-
clusions stated in this type of government report, the trial judge was in good company:
see Lords Reid, Hodson and Pearce in Esso, supra, note 2 at 301, 320, 322.
122 3 O.R. (2d) at 279-80; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 199-200. It is not altogether clear
from the opinions in the case just what products in addition to gasoline were covered
by the solus agreement. The opinion of the Court of Appeal states (at 3) that Palen
agreed to deal exclusively in Gulfs gasoline, other petroleum based products and anti-
freeze and other automotive products with which Gulf might choose to supply him. The
testimony of Dr. English, plaintiff's expert economist, seems to have been based on the
assumption that Palen was obligated to carry a wide range of automotive products dis-
tributed by Gulf: 3 O.R. "(2d) at 276-79; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 196-99; and the trial judge
referred to "products such as oils, greases, additives, tires, batteries and accessories ...
made available by Gulf", 3 O.R. (2d) at 269; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 189. While the tri-partite
agreement of 1960 incorporated by reference all of the 1956 agreement for loan, specific
reference was made to Stephens' obligation to deal exclusively only in the "petroleum
products of the company", supra, note 4 at 6.
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out, these supposed ill-effects did not come about from the existence of the
one solus agreement involved in the case, but he felt justified on the bases of
both testimony at trial and "common knowledge" in finding agreements of
this type to be common in the industry.'23
The Court of Appeal held the solus agreement to be not unreasonable
from the point of view of the public interest. 24 The court held that the trial
judge had erred both in identifying the relevant public interest and in evaluat-
ing the evidence.
Quoting a stunningly opaque passage in the opinion of Ungoed-Thomas,
J. in Texaco Ltd. v. Mulberry Filling Station Ltd.,125 the Court of Appeal in
Stephens stated that in applying the second limb of the Nordenfelt test of
reasonableness, "one has to consider whether the restrictions were reasonable
in reference to the interests of the public as expressed in one or more proposi-
tions of law, rather than in reference to the interests of the public at large".
It is inappropriate to consider the interests of the public at large, the court
reasoned, again quoting the judgement in Texaco, because such a consideration
would, first, involve the court in balancing a mass of conflicting economic,
social and other interests which a court of law is il-equipped to do, and,
second, produce declarations of what is public policy that would vary from
judge to judge "like the length of the chancellor's foot".
The only "proposition of law" relating to the public interest and relevant
to the facts of this case that the Court of Appeal was able to identify was "the
right of men to trade freely, subject to reasonable restraints". Since the court
had already found this agreement to be reasonable as between the parties,2 6
it was not about to find it unreasonable "for some fancied and problematical
injury to the public welfare".,2 7
While one has considerable sympathy for what may be taken to be the
Court of Appeal's over-all position - that courts are inappropriate bodies to
make determinations on questions of economics - the court's opinion presents
a variety of difficulties. First, it is doubtful that courts are any less competent
to make determinations on questions involving economic evidence than on
those involving, for example, medical evidence. The latter types of questions
are dealt with judicially every day in negligence and homicide cases. In either
situation, what is important is that there be a sufficient basis in expert testi-
123 3 O.R. (2d) at 275, 280; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 195, 200. One may doubt just how
'common' such knowledge is to persons not familiar with the industry.
1 2 4 The following discussion of the public interest aspects of the Court of Appeal's
opinion has reference to pp. 34 to 39 of the unreported opinion.
12 5 Supra, note 2 at 527.
126 The findings as to reasonableness both in the private and the public interests is
a question of law and not of fact, and an appellate court therefore must make its own
determination on reasonableness: Amoco v. Rocca Bros., supra, note 2 at 399; A.G.
Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., supra, note 71 at 797.
12 7 Quoting Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (8th ed. London: Butter-
worths, 1972) at 366.
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mony for the court to make an intelligent finding. 2 8 In the instant case, there
was such a basis in the form of the testimony of Dr. English, whose extensive
qualifications and impressive credentials were noted by the trial court. 29 Dr.
English was the only expert witness, defendants themselves not having chosen
to call an expert economist. While the trial court could have chosen to dis-
regard the testimony of plaintiff's expert, it certainly was not obligated to do
so. In a future restraint of trade case involving a solus agreement in the
gasoline industry, the party asserting the validity of the agreement might
choose to call its own expert to testify that the effect of the type of agreement
was not anti-competitive, and if the court were to find that expert's views
convincing, the fact that the result would be inconsistent with the result in the
trial court judgement in Stephens would not be intolerable.
The difficult point, however, and the one which may differentiate eco-
nomic evidence in a restraint of trade case from medical evidence in a tort
action, is that the court must weigh the economic evidence in the context of
an identification, not to say declaration, of what is the relevant public interest.
The trial judge in Stephens felt that, largely on the basis of the policy behind
the Combines Investigation Act, he could identify the public interest as pres-
ervation of a competitive market for automotive products. 1 0 It has been
stated by an eminent scholar that one guide to the identification of public
policy that courts "are certain to employ whenever it is available is statutory
legislation in pari materia".131 The Combines Investigation Act as it existed
at times relevant to the Stephens case, on the other hand, said nothing about
exclusive dealing arrangements in particular, although that has been changed
by very recent amendments. 32 While application of the policy behind a statute
12 8 And it does not hurt to have an expert trial judge. For the fifteen years immedi-
ately prior to his appointment to the Ontario Supreme Court, David H. W. Henry was
Director of Investigation and Research under the Combines Investigation Act, a fact of
which he advised the parties in the litigation in the event that they should wish to dis-
qualify him. They did not so wish (unreported trial judgment at 40). While the trial
court is bound to make its findings exclusively on the basis of the evidence before it, in
interpreting that evidence the judge cannot ignore his or her own experience. Nor would
such a discounting be necessarily desirable, even if possible, unless we can assert that
judges are effective in inverse proportion to the breadth of their experience. It is not
even unheard of for a trial judge ignorant in a field of learning as to which crucial
evidence is to be adduced in a case to familiarize himself with that field: see United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 at 650 (S.D.N.Y., 1953).
129 3 O.R. (2d) at 275; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 195.
130 3 O.R. (2d) at 274; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 194.
131 P. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law (1929), 42 Harv. Law
Rev. 76 at 97. In Sherk v. Horowitz, supra, note 118, the court looked to statutorily ex-
pressed policies in favour of untrammelled access to medical care in identifying a public
interest in patients' free choice among doctors.
132 An Act to Amend the Combines Investigation Act 1975, c. 76, s. 12 (in force
January 1, 1976). Section 32 of the Act as it existed before the recent amendments,
(R.S.C. 1971, c. 314, s. 1), is a general prohibition against agreements that prevent or
lessen competition "unduly", but "unduly" has been interpreted to mean virtual elimina-
tion of competition, (see Cartwright, J. in R. v. Howard Smith Paper Mills, [1957]
S.C.R. 403), and the section has been used by the government exclusively to attack
horizontal collusion, usually blatant price fixing. As to whether s. 32 of the unamended
Act could have been interpreted to cover vertically imposed anti-competitive arrange-
ments, see D. Cayne, Market Power, Efficiencies, and the Public Interest in Canadian
Combines Law (1970), 16 McGill Law J. 488 at 510, n. 61.
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to facts not covered by its terms may appear odd at first, it is submitted that
on balance the trial judge was correct here. Competition in the marketplace
is well enough accepted as a desideratum in Canada today, at least for those
areas of the economy not subject to pervasive public utility-type regulation,
that a court may conclude that the public interest is in that state of affairs
which will promote, or at least not impede, competition.
The Court of Appeal's view seems to be that courts should refrain
from deciding cases on grounds of public interest because the opinions of
the different courts as to the content of the public interest would vary, as
the length of the chancellor's foot, or would be capricious, as the unruly horse.
But courts, except possibly in the relatively rare cases where they are con-
struing the clearest of statutes, are always declaring public policy either ex-
pressly or sub silentio. Even the decision of a court in a given litigation not
to act, to rule for the defendant and leave the parties in the status quo ante,
is a declaration that public policy is not offended by leaving the defendant in
his natural position of advantage of which the plaintiff complains. In fact, in
restraint of trade cases, "public policy" is almost a form of imprecation that
judges hurl at anyone who would make a decision contrary to the one ad-
vocated by the particular judge: "any other result would amount simply to
the opinion of a mere judge as to what is public policy". And the defence
mechanism can be used equally to enforce or invalidate an agreement. Com-
pare, for example, the decisions in favour of restrictive agreements in Mogul
Steamship;183 Texaco v. Mulberry Filling Station;34 and Ontario Salt Co. v.
Merchants Salt Co. 3 5 with decisions invalidating such agreements in U.S. v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.136 and Standard Oil Co. of California v. U.S. 137
In all of these decisions the respective courts declared that any result other
than the one reached would require judges to enunciate public policy accord-
ing to their own whims.
As for the variability of judicially declared public policy, while it would
concededly be intolerable to have different judges faced with similar fact
situations contemporaneously finding mutually contradictory public policies,
it is nonetheless appropriate, as the Court of Appeal in Stephens recognized,
that "the reconciliation of the rights of freedom of contract and freedom of
trade, and the determination of what is in the public interest, will vary with
the changes in economic conditions from time to time". 38 As Professor
13 3 Supra, note 63 at 45 (Lord Bramwell), and at 50-51 (Lord Morris).
13 4 Supra, note 2 at 525-26.
135 (1871), 18 Gr. 540, 549 (Ont. Ch.).
18 0 Supra, note 87 at 283.
137 Supra, note 50 at 310-14 (Frankfurter, J.)
13 8 Supra, note 4 at 13, citing the Vancouver Malt case, supra, note 28 at 189,
wherein Lord MacMillan observed that:
Mhe scope of a doctrine which is founded on public policy necessarily alters as
economic conditions alter. Public policy is not a constant. More especially is this
so where the doctrine represents a compromise between two principles of public
policy ... the principle that persons ... should be held to their bond and . . .
the principle that every person should have unfettered liberty to exercise his power
and capacities for his own and the community's benefit.
See also, Younger, L.J. in Attwood v. Lamont, supra, note 11 at 581.
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Winfield wrote a half century ago, "[t]his variability of public policy is a stone
in the edifice of the doctrine, and not a missile to be flung at it."'' 9 Capri-
ciousness in the declaration of public policy will be avoided if judges will
attend to legislatively declared policy on analogous questions, where available,
and to other judicial declarations on the subject as guides. "[The better view
seems to be that the difficulty of discovering what public policy is at any
given moment certainly does not absolve the bench from the duty of doing
SO".14o
In Stephens, the Court of Appeal, as an independent ground for reversing
the trial judge on the public interest question, held that even if it were appro-
priate for a court to make a more wide-ranging inquiry into the public interest,
and even if the trial judge were correct in finding the dominant public interest
to be "the dynamic operation of the competitive market", there was not suf-
ficient evidence before the trial court upon which it could conclude that the
operation of the agreement in question was contrary to that public interest.
For reasons discussed above, 141 it is submitted that the Court of Appeal was
incorrect, and that the evidence in the form of expert testimony was sufficient,
if believed, to support the trial judge's finding.
In Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Dickson, Lord Wilberforce
was sceptical as to whether any public interest consideration, other than the
interest that a man be able to trade freely, could be taken into account by a
court of common law as opposed to a specialized tribunal such as the Restric-
tive Trade Practices Court.142 While the writer would not narrowly prescribe
the range of inquiry that may be made by the common law court,143 a happier
solution may well be the legislative one, such as the vertical restraint provisions
recently added to the Combines Investigation Act. Under s. 31.4 of the
amended Act, the Director of Investigation and Research may bring a pro-
ceeding before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in a case of ex-
139 Supra, note 131 at 95.
140 Id. at 97. The passage of which the quotation appears as the last sentence reads:
How is public policy evidenced? If it is so variable, if it depends on the welfare
of the community at any given time, how are the courts to ascertain it? Some
judges have thought this difficulty so great, that they have urged that it would be
solved much better by the legislature and have considered it to be the main reason
why the courts should leave public policy alone. Others, while accepting the doc-
trine, have uttered a warning that the judges are more to be trusted as interpreters
of the law than as expounders of public policy. This admonition is a wise one
and judges are not likely to forget it. But the better view seems to be that the
difficulty .... (citations omitted).
141 Text accompanying notes 128-29, supra.
142 Supra, note 35 at 441.
143 Nor apparently would Lord Wilberforce himself have done so when he con-
sidered the scope of the public interest inquiry some fifteen months earlier, in the Esso
case, supra, note 2 at 340-41, where he stated:
[Iln relation to many agreements containing restrictions, there may well be wider
issues affecting the interests of the public than those which relate merely to the
interests of the parties; these may have been the subject of inquiry as in this case
under statutory powers (Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act, 1948) or the
subject of a finding by another court (Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956)
or may be investigated by the court itself. (Emphasis added).
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elusive dealing, tied selling or market restriction.1 44 Where the Commission,
after notice and hearing, finds that the practice, because it is widespread in a
market or is engaged in by a major supplier of a product in a market, is likely
substantially to lessen competition, the Commission may make an order pro-
hibiting the practice. Of course, s. 31.4 will only avail where the Director
chooses in his discretion to bring a proceeding before the Commission. Private
parties are left to their common law remedies. 4
D. CONCLUSION
One may legitimately ask, considering the very narrow approach to the
public interest adopted by the Court of Appeal, and considering that the public
interest may in any event be taken into account in considering the legitimate
interests of the parties,1 46 whether there is anything left today to the public
interest as a separate test of reasonableness under Nordenfelt. In Esso, Lord
Pearce stated that the two aspects of the Nordenfelt test should be fused,147 a
conclusion with which the Ontario Court of Appeal is in sympathy. 48 On the
other hand, Lord Wilberforce in Esso emphasized that it was "important that
the vitality of the second limb ... should continue to be recognized", 149 and
the Australian High Court in Amoco stated that the distinction between the
first and second branches of the Nordenfelt test is not obliterated.00 Ironically,
Lord Hodson in Esso stated that he would prefer to have rested the decision
"on the public interest rather than that of the parties, public interest being a
surer foundation than the interest of private persons or corporations when
widespread commercial activities ... are concerned".' 5 '
What may prove, however, to be the most influential undermining of the
public interest branch of the Nordenfelt test comes from an unexpected source,
the opinion of Lord Diplock in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v.
Macauley. There His Lordship appears to suggest that the entire doctrine of
restraint of trade had been nothing more nor less than a facade behind which
courts have sought refuge in order to avoid enforcing contracts unconscion-
able as between the parties:
It is, in my view, salutory to acknowledge that in refusing to enforce provisions
of a contract whereby one party agrees for the benefit of the other party to exploit
'44 "Market restriction" is defined in s. 31.4(1) of the Act to be a practice whereby
a supplier of a product, as a condition to supplying it, limits to a defined market the right
of the purchaser to re-sell it.
145 Where the Director does bring a proceeding before the Commission and where
the Commission makes an order prohibiting the supplier from engaging in the practice
and where the supplier fails to comply with the order, then s. 31.1 of the amended Act
confers upon a party injured by such failure a cause of action for damages. That is, an
injured private party has a statutory cause of action when unlikelihood is piled upon
unlikelihood.
146 Supra, text accompanying notes 71-75.
147 Supra, note 2 at 324.
148S upra, note 4 at 35.
140 Supra, note 2 at 341.
15o Supra, note 2 at 400.
5l1 Supra, note 2 at 321.
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or to refrain from exploiting his own earning power, the public policy which the
court is implementing is not some 19th century economic theory about the benefit
to the general public of freedom of trade, but the protection of those whose bar-
gaining power is weak against being forced by those whose bargaining power is
stronger to enter into bargains that are unconscionable. 5 2
While, as previously indicated, 15 3 the writer agrees that modem courts
usually are swayed in the restraint of trade context by a comparison of what
a dealer has given his supplier as against what he has received, a difficulty
with Lord Diplock's quoted view as a matter of historical analysis is that in
two of the recent trilogy of gasoline cases holding the solus agreements un-
enforceable under the private interests branch of the Nordenfelt test, the court
found that there was not inequality of bargaining power between the parties.'54
To this Lord Diplock might be expected to reply that the findings in these
cases were not realistic: while it is true to say that the oil companies
needed outlets just as the proprietors needed oil companies, that is not to say
that the parties were of equal bargaining power. Furthermore, if the service
station proprietors had possessed a bargaining power equal to that of the oil
companies, it is hard to see why they would have accepted obligations that
the courts found excessively onerous. Indeed, to state that a small entrepreneur
has bargaining power equal to that of a giant oil company wielding a standard
form contract comes close to defying common sense.
152 Supra, note 26 at 623. Lord Diplock's views were pressaged by his judgment
(as Diplock, LJ.) in Petrofina, supra, note 2 at 181, and his 'realism' appears already
to be commanding a following: see the opinion of Lord Denning, M.R. in Clifford
Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R. 237.
5 3 Supra, text accompanying note 105.
15 4 Esso, supra, note 2 at 301, 313, 322; Amoco, supra, note 2 at 400. The opinions
of the Court of Appeal in Petrofina are silent on the matter of equality of bargaining
power, and, therefore, Lord Diplock cannot be accused of contradicting Diplock, LJ.
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